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A CONSISTENT WAY WITH PARADOX
ABSTRACT
Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a  proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of  the expressive capacities of language.

I  Rejection of Bivalence
Jean Buridan was, to the best of our knowledge, the first logician to discuss a particularly intriguing variant of the Liar paradox in which the only thing that Socrates says is that what Plato is saying is false, and what Plato is saying — in fact, the only thing he is saying — is that what Socrates is saying is false. This is Buridan’s Eighth Sophism (Hughes 1982: 73-79). 

	Socrates: What Plato is saying is false.
	Plato: What Socrates is saying is false.

At first sight, there is nothing paradoxical about the utterances in question. Suppose that what Socrates says is true. Then we can, without contradiction, conclude that what Plato says is false. For if Plato is false in his claim that what Socrates is saying is false, it follows, classically, that what Socrates is saying is true, just as we originally supposed. Likewise, if we suppose that what Plato is saying is true, then we can consistently maintain that what Socrates is saying is false. In sum, although we may not be able to determine which of Socrates and Plato is speaking the truth, we can claim, quite consistently, that whichever one is saying something true, the other must be saying something false. So where is the paradox?  The paradox arises from a consideration about symmetry. In Buridan’s words: ‘There is no more reason why Socrates’ proposition should be true, or false, than Plato’s, or vice versa, since they stand in an exactly similar relation to each other. So I shall assume that if either is true, so is the other, and if either is false, so is the other’. (Hughes 1982: 73)  It is this reasonable assumption of Buridan’s that contradicts the result we just obtained, namely that the statements of Socrates and Plato have opposite truth-values.
Bradley Armour-Garb and James Woodbridge (2006) term this example of Buridan’s the open pair,​[1]​ and it is their contention that consideration of variants of the open pair reveal that both consistentists and dialetheists have failed to diagnose and to treat semantic pathology. Whatever the merit of their case against the dialetheist, their criticism of consistentism fails, or, at least, it fails rather straightforwardly against one of the versions of consistentism that they discuss.  It is important to show where their criticism goes wrong because obviously a consistent solution to paradoxes in the Liar family and to the other semantical paradoxes is a prize well worth having, and the plausibility of a candidate solution may be measured, in part, by the ease and naturalness with which it resists objections.
Attending to the open pair affords a very simple argument for rejecting the Principle of Bivalence. We have (I use Armour-Garb and Woodbridge’s labels)

(DA)  If each statement in the open pair has a unique truth-value, then each has the opposite value of the other.
(SA)    If each statement in the open pair has a unique truth-value, then each has the same value as the other.

The truth of (DA) may be verified by inspection. (SA) is the symmetry assumption and is not a principle of logic, but a principle of reasonableness (rather like the legal principle stare decisis that enjoins treating similar cases similarly). We follow Graham Priest (2005: 690) in holding that it would be ‘a manifest a priori repugnance’ to deny it but, thanks to a clever example due to Dan López de Sa and Elia Zardini (2007), adapted below, we can prove that such repugnance is warranted. Consider the following pair of sentences, Jack and Jill:

Jack: If Jill is true, then (Jack is false and it is not the case that (Jack is believable and Jill is unbelievable)).
Jill: If Jack is true, then (Jill is false and it is not the case that (Jill is believable and Jack is unbelievable)).

where ‘if’ expresses material implication. Inspection reveals that Jack and Jill cannot consistently have the same truth-value. But if we suppose that one of them is true, the other false, then it follows that the true one is unbelievable while the false one is believable. This conclusion is not just repugnant, it is blatantly wrong since there is nothing to choose between Jack and Jill in terms of believability.​[2]​
(DA) with (SA) entails that it is not the case that each statement in the open pair has a unique truth-value, and the same goes for the Jack/Jill pair. Rejection of the Principle of Bivalence can take two non-exclusive forms. The first is the dialetheic proposal, favoured by Priest, that some sentences have the ‘glut’ value ‘both true and false’; the second, which is the one pursued in what follows, is the suggestion that there are truth-value gaps. (The reason for preferring gaps to gluts will emerge in due course.) In particular, taking statements to be what are true or false, we shall be exploring the idea that the phenomenon of truth-value gaps is a matter of some sentences failing to yield statements, even though those sentences are perfectly meaningful.

II  In Defence of Gaps
The variant of the open pair that, according to Armour-Garb and Woodbridge, spells trouble for the gappist approach to semantical paradox is what they call the asymmetric open pair:

(1): (2) is false.
(2): (2) is false → (1) is false.

As Armour-Garb and Woodbridge point out, (1) and (2) are not symmetric in the way that the sentences in the standard open pair are. There is thus no reason, they say, to think that (SA) applies here and so no reason to think that (1) and (2) have the same truth-value.
	Clearly the asymmetric open pair looks rather different to the standard open pair, but the two are not as different as Armour-Garb and Woodbridge suppose. Let us tinker a little, operating within the bounds of classical logic. Forgetting, for the time being, niceties of the sentence/statement distinction and the question of what sorts of thing are truth-bearers, we can say, looking at the top line of the asymmetric open pair, that (1) is a sentence to the effect that (2) is false, so that, employing the T-schema, for ‘(2) is false’ we can substitute ‘(1) is true’. Let us make this substitution in the bottom line. The result is

(2): (1) is true  → (1) is false.

Now, classically, ‘p is true → p is false’ is equivalent to ‘p is false’. So, using the available simplification, the ‘asymmetric’ open pair comes to be rewritten as

(1): (2) is false.
(2): (1) is false.

Symmetry is restored! And we now have a licence, courtesy of (SA), for declaring both (1) and (2) truth-valueless!
	The above paragraph, amusing, perhaps, as a juggling act, deflects our attention from the real reason for ascribing truth-value gaps to both (1) and (2). Consideration of the standard open pair ought to make us receptive to the idea that it is reasonable to ascribe truth-value gaps in cases where assuming bivalence leads to contradiction or indeterminacy. This applies to all members of the Liar family, not just to those symmetrical examples where (SA) can be invoked. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge fail to see this because they mistakenly attribute to consistentists and dialetheists alike the assumption ‘that if we can consistently (as opposed to inconsistently) ascribe semantic values to the sentences of a set, σ, then we are enjoined to do so’ (2006: 404). This assumption is mistaken, because, although it may be logically possible to ascribe semantic values to the sentences of a certain set, it may yet be quite unreasonable to do so. By way of comparison, consider the following set of number-designating expressions:

The next number + 3
The next number + 5
The previous number -5

Although we could consistently ascribe the value 217 to the first of these expressions, 214 to the second and 209 to the third, it would hardly be reasonable to say that those are the numbers designated by those expressions respectively (because we could also consistently ascribe any  triple of numbers <x, y, z> where y = x-3 = z+5). Closer to home, it would be possible consistently to ascribe the value ‘true’ to each member of the infinite series

	The next statement is true.
	The next statement is true.
	…………. etc.

but it would hardly be reasonable to do so, given that we could equally, consistently, ascribe the value ‘false’ to each of them.​[3]​ A Dialetheist might ascribe the value ‘true and false’ to each of them, but one should note the implausibility of making the counterpart move for the numerical example above. That would involve saying that a singular term designates an infinite number of numbers! What seems most reasonable, under the circumstances, is to acknowledge that no numerical values should be ascribed as designata of those singular terms, and that no truth-values should be ascribed to members of the aforementioned infinite series of sentences or to either member of the asymmetrical open pair. The only objection that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge have to taking this ‘gap’ route is that it would offend against what they call the Dialetheist Conjecture (2006: 400, 404). Since that is simply the conjecture that consistentism is inadequate, the consistentist will not lose much sleep over the objection, unless he or she is convinced that there really are serious obstacles to a consistent treatment of semantic pathology.

III  Semantic Malfunction
 What, then, are the obstacles? The ‘Dialetheist Conjecture’ is that any consistent account of semantic pathology is bound to fall foul of ‘revenge’ problems, or to import ad hoc assumptions, or to be incomplete in that it looks plausible only for a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes, or to unwarrantedly restrict the expressive capacities of language. In order to see whether any of these charges stick, it will be useful to take as our starting point Armour-Garb and Woodbridge’s discussion of semantic malfunctioning. They point out that, in the case of the standard Liar

(L): (L) is false.

the reasoning that leads to a contradiction can be blocked by rejecting the Principle of  Bivalence but that this tactic seems ineffective against the Strengthened Liar

		   (L`):  (L`) is not true.

for, if (L`) is neither true nor false, then a fortiori it is not true, but, since that’s exactly what (L`) says itself to be (viz. not true) then (L`) is, after all true — contradicting our assumption that it is neither true nor false. Paradox regained.​[4]​ Desperation sets in. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge continue: ‘Fearing the worst, a theorist might refuse to characterise (L`) in any of the standard ways — perhaps by concocting a new characterization, δ, that classifies (L`) as without a semantic status. She is then confronted with

   (L``):  (L``) is δ.,

from which a contradiction seems unavoidable’ (2006: 396).
	Unavoidable it isn’t. Armour-Garb and Woodbridge overlook the possibility that (L``) is simply false. In other words, it’s false that (L``) is without a semantic status, i.e. it is true that (L``) has a semantic status, namely falsity. Similarly, we should want to say that ‘This statement lacks content’ is false, i.e. it falsely states that it lacks content. Where ‘F’ is a predicate that applies to (i.e. is true of false of) statements (or propositions), the sentence ‘This statement is F’ will, paradoxical cases aside, yield a statement — frequently one the truth-value of which is easy to determine; e.g. ‘This statement is completely uninteresting’. There are genuinely self-referential statements. There are also statements that contain a reference not to themselves but to the sentences that are used to make them. ‘This sentence contains ten words, seven of which are verbs’ is an example.
	In correspondence, Armour-Garb and Woodbridge informed me that, instead of (L``) they should have used the example

   (L``+):  (L``+) is false or is without a semantic status.

Thinking about (L``) and (L``+) leads one to ponder the question of just what does lack a semantic status. Chalk and cheese lack semantic status as do inscriptions such as ink marks on paper. What appears on the next line also lacks semantic status:

bureau dans de de est La le ma mon oncle plume tante

This can be viewed as a pure inscription — a group of marks — or it can be viewed as an arrangement of French words. Re-arranging those words thus:

		La plume de ma tante est dans le bureau de mon oncle

results in a sentence that conforms to the rules of French grammar (for reasons unknown to me, it is taken to be a paradigm of the sort of sentence that occurs in old-fashioned books on French grammar). But although it has a certain semantic status, in that it can be translated into other languages and could be used to make a statement, when a token of it occurs in a French grammar book it does not make a statement — no particular aunt, uncle, pen or desk are referred to; no particular state of affairs is described; no truth-value can be ascribed. J.L Austin called such a syntactical entity a grapheme (a pheme being the audio version) (Austin 1975: 91-98). I have been calling this entity the sentence, following Strawson:
The sentence ‘The table is covered with books’ is significant and everyone knows what it means. But if I ask ‘What object is that sentence about?’ I am asking an absurd question — a question which cannot be asked about a sentence but only about some use of the sentence. (Strawson 1950: 328).
A sentence may be used to say something true or false and, when successfully so used, a statement is made. A statement is the content expressed when a declarative sentence is successfully used in discourse; the statement thus made is either true or false. The sentences ‘La plume de ma tante est dans le bureau de mon oncle’ and ‘The table is covered with books’ have meaning (are meaningful) in the sense that we understand and can translate them, but, with the exception of eternal sentences, what a sentence is used to say varies with the occasion of its use; on one occasion a token may be used to make a true statement; on another occasion, a token of the same type may be used to make a false statement. In Strawson’s words again:
We cannot talk of the sentence being true or false, but only of its being used to make a true or false assertion, or (if this is preferred) to express a true or false proposition (Strawson 1950: 326).
Prefacing a (non-eternal) sentence with the words ‘It is true that’ or ‘It is false that’ results, of course, only in another sentence that cannot itself be true or false. The resulting sentence typically can be used to make a statement that is either true or false. It is persons who make statements by using sentences with certain intentions, but frequently we metonymously ascribe the making of a statement to a token so used (e.g., in writing).
There is a distinction carefully drawn by Strawson in the first above-quoted passage, one that is commonly neglected by subsequent authors. A sentence may be meaningful or significant but it does not say or state anything and a fortiori does not say anything true and does not say anything false. It is statements (what sentences are used to make) that are true or false. Meaning, in the aforementioned sense, is quite different from what is said. Strawson held (controversially) that sometimes the use of a meaningful sentence on an occasion does not yield a statement, does not succeed in saying anything. This is a controversy into which I shall not enter here. What I shall attempt to show is that sentences in the Liar family, while perfectly meaningful, cannot be used to make statements, cannot be used to say anything true or anything false.
A first consideration is this: Sentences are syntactical entities and so do not have truth conditions. When a sentence is successfully used to make a statement, the statement has intentionality; it is appropriate to ask, with Strawson, ‘What object or objects, if any, is that statement about?’ for the referring terms are successfully used to refer, and something is said, truly or falsely, about the object or objects to which reference is made. In other words, statements have truth-conditions. In fact, since a statement cannot be identified by the criteria that identify the sentence from which it is made, a plausible way of identifying the statement made is via its truth conditions. For example, when Tyler Burge, at some particular time t makes a statement by using the sentence ‘I am feeling as sick as my dog looks’ then what he says is true just on condition that, at t, Burge is feeling as sick as Burge’s dog looks. Obviously when Saul Kripke uses a token of the same type sentence, what he says — the statement he makes — is different, a difference that shows up immediately we give the truth conditions of his statement. Likewise, if you know no German but hear a speaker assert ‘Schnee ist weiss’, I can identify for you the statement made (or the proposition expressed) by that speaker by giving its truth conditions: it is true if and only if snow is white. The right hand side of that biconditional is ‘grounded’ in that snow is, inter alia, the stuff that, in the actual world, is fast receding from Alpine peaks, and its color can be ascertained by looking. Contrast the truth-teller sentence
 
(TT): (TT) is true.

Trying to reveal, by giving truth conditions, the identity of a statement made by the use of that sentence results only in the unrevealing ‘(TT) is true iff (TT) is true’. Similarly, the attempt to identify what statement is made by the use of (L`) by specifying its truth conditions results only in ‘(L`) is true iff ~ (L`) is true’. Both of these biconditionals are uninformative, so no statements are identified by them and it remains in doubt whether there are any statements made by the use of  (TT) or (L`).​[5]​

IV  Ambiguous Ostension
 At this juncture, it will be useful to introduce a pointing device. When I point to a tarantula and say ‘I’d like that for my mother-in-law’s bedroom’, it is not clear (from the information given so far) exactly what I mean. It could be that I want to release the deadly creature into the room where my mother-in-law sleeps, or it could be that, finding its appearance alluring, I would like to have the carcass, perhaps stuffed and mounted, as a decoration for the wall. Or it could be that it is the colour-scheme for her room that I’d like to base on the subtle colouring of the spider. There are many more, and more bizarre, possibilities for what my ostension ostends. My original saying and pointing did not eliminate any of these possibilities. For the purpose of pointing to linguistic entities, I shall use a demonstrative together with an arrow to point to it, and my demonstration, just as in the tarantula example, will not eliminate any of the possibilities — what is pointed to could be a sentence or it could be a statement, a rheme, an inscription etc.. Many such devices are in common use. For example, an author may indicate support elsewhere in the book for a claim baldly stated at p.225 by writing ‘For a detailed defence of this claim, see pp.247-9’. The reader’s attention is being drawn not to a group of sentences, but to some evidence or an argument that the author is using those sentences to propound.

V  The Strengthened Liar
Let us now revert to the Strengthened Liar. For ease of exposition, I shall not use Armour-Garb and Woodbridge’s (L`) but its indexical variant which utilizes the sentence ‘This statement is not true’. As already noted, neither the presence of the phrase ‘This statement’ nor of the predicate ‘true’ ensures that this sentence makes a statement. And we should not assume that a use of this sentence will deliver a statement for, as we shall later indicate, there is good reason for supposing that it will not.
Reasoning about the putative truth-conditions of a use of the indexical Strengthened Liar sentence, we have:
	
		If that ↓ is true,

		This statement is not true.

then it ↑ is a statement that truly says that it ↑ is not true. Hence it ↑ is not true. But if it ↑ is not true then it ↑ is a statement that correctly states itself to be not true, and is hence true. Contradiction?
	No, it is not. The reasoning in the preceding paragraph is incorrect, and we can pinpoint just where it goes wrong. The offending passage is ‘if it ↑ is not true then it ↑ is a statement’. If what was being pointed to were false then it would be a statement, because to say something that is either true or false is to make a statement. But the predicate ‘is not true’ is distinguished from ‘is false’, and should be read, as in (L``+), as ‘is false or is without a semantic status’. It is precisely this difference between ‘false’ and ‘not true’ that gives the Strengthened Liar its bite. Now, if what is pointed to really does lack the semantic status of being either true or false (e.g. if it is merely a grammatically correct sentence, or a string of marks etc.) then, since it is not a statement, it does not state anything (in particular, it does not state that it is not true) and we can truly state of it that it is not true, because it lacks the semantic status of being truth-valued.​[6]​ Given a certain amount of poetic licence, we could say that what is pointed to tries to call itself a statement — just as ‘The number 3 greater than itself’ tries to call itself a number. The latter mentioned phrase fails to designate a number. If what is pointed to in our version of the Strengthened Liar fails to be a statement then the above reasoning to a contradiction is blocked.
Commenting on the two sentences in the open pair, Graham Priest (2005, footnote 3) writes: ‘There is, of course (this) symmetrical possibility: that they are both neither true nor false. In particular, then, each is not false. But each says the other is false; so each is false after all — and so true. Better to say that the sentences are both true and false’. What Priest does not see is that if being neither true nor false is a matter of failing to make a statement, then each sentence in the open pair cannot say (or state) that the other is false.
	There are independent reasons for holding that what is pointed to in the version of the Strengthened Liar just discussed cannot be a statement. Consider the inscription below:

   K lacks a semantic status.

This consists of a series of separate ink marks with familiar shapes. There is nothing to be said against naming this inscription ‘K’ (see also Kripke (1975: 56)). The name ‘K’ has a semantic status. It is the name of a token inscription at the left end of which is a mark that looks like this: K. But contrast ‘S’, stipulated to be the name of the statement that S is not true. That S is not true has a truth-value different from that of S. Hence ‘S’ cannot be the name of the statement that S is not true.  So the stipulation was unsuccessful. Since choice of the name ‘S’ was arbitrary — any letter could have been used — the conclusion, stated in full generality, is that there can be no statement that says of itself that it is not true. (L), (L`), (L``) and (L``+) may be meaningful sentences but they fail to yield statements. (Similarly — though a proper discussion of the matter would take me too far afield — although the words ‘This thought is untrue’ or ‘Everything currently thought in Room 101 is untrue’ (when, unbeknownst to me, say, I am one of the occupants of that room) may run through my head, I cannot have the thought that the very thought that I am having is untrue.)

VI  Further Strengthened Examples
It might be thought that, if we attend to the distinction between sentences and statements and are careful to ascribe truth or falsity only to the latter, we may yet be able to contrive examples that defeat the kind of approach to semantical paradox that has been proposed above. One example suggested by Paul Saka (2007: 222) is

(PS): Sentence (PS) does not make a true statement.

(I have changed Saka’s label and terminology.) Saka examines the claim that (PS) does not make a statement, aliter, does not express a proposition. It follows from this claim that (PS) does not make a true statement. But that conclusion, argues Saka, is precisely what (PS) says, and this shows that the ‘no statement’ theory is self-defeating.
	Saka’s argument, if read as directed against the approach advocated here, is question-begging. His opponent contends that (PS) is a sentence that fails to make a statement and is prepared to agree that, a fortiori, it does not make a true statement. But that opponent is hardly likely to agree that that is precisely what (PS) itself says, for that opponent takes the view that sentence (PS) says nothing nor can be used to say anything — it does not yield a statement — despite (like other sentences in the Liar family) having the appearance of doing so. In this instance, that appearance is reinforced by the fact that Saka and we ourselves do successfully use a token of the same type as (PS) when reasoning about that sentence. But Saka simply assumes that the first token (above) which is labelled ‘(PS)’ also says something or is used to say something, and this is exactly what his opponent denies.
	In an amusing coda to his argument, Saka remarks that his opponent can maintain a consistent position only by neither asserting nor believing (PS) — because (PS) expresses no proposition it cannot be asserted or believed — but that if nobody asserts or believes (PS) then his opponent’s theory is left without advocates! Our response is that, for reasons already adumbrated, the sentence ‘This sentence does not make a true statement’ does not make a statement (unless the ‘This’ is pointing to some other sentence). Now, if we write out a token of that sentence and immediately underneath it write ‘This sentence does not make a true statement’, where the ‘This’ is pointing to another sentence, namely the token above it, then the sentence below succeeds in making a true statement about the token sentence immediately above itself. We have, of course, deliberately engineered things so that the two tokens are of one type, but, of course, perspicuity would have been served by using a ‘That’ instead of a ‘This’ in the sentence underneath, thereby emphasizing that the two sentences are functionally different. The difference can also be brought out by employing labels and our ‘pointer’ notation:

(L`):  (L`) is not true.
(K`): (L`) ↑ is not true. 

This can be given a perfectly consistent reading if the arrow in the statement (K`) points to the sentence (L`). The sentence (L`) does not itself succeed in making any statement. Similarly, if we take seriously the idea that ‘This sentence either makes a false statement or no statement at all’ is a sentence that fails to make a statement, then the sentence in question cannot be used to state (truly or falsely) that it either makes a false statement or no statement at all. We can consistently assign the value (or verdict) ‘cannot be used to make a statement’ to it, but it itself cannot contra-dict (gain-say) that verdict since it is not a statement and does not say anything; and in particular, it does not make a true statement to the effect that it makes no statement at all.
There is a rather neat connection between the difference in status between (L`) and (K`) and Moore’s paradox. Imagine a speech community that uses not personal names, but an ‘X’ accompanied by a pointing gesture. A member of this community might say ‘The train is arriving on time but X ↑ doesn’t believe it’. But suppose that X herself says ‘The train is arriving on time but X ← doesn’t believe it’. (X is pointing at herself.) . In discussions of Moore’s paradox it is generally regarded as a datum that the latter kind of utterance with self-pointing is in some way absurd, whereas sentences of the same kind but with other-pointing yield true or false statements.

VII  Review		
Let us now step back to review whether the approach to semantic pathology advocated here (sometimes know by the mediaeval term ‘Cassatio’, because it holds that, in some cases, a sentence fails to yield a statement; the attempt is cassated or nullified) refutes the Dialetheist Conjecture.

Revenge. Revenge comes in the form of strengthened variants. We have addressed those variants discussed by Armour-Garb, Woodbridge and others, and have shown that paradox is dissolved if we are careful to distinguish statements from sentences. There is obviously and non-paradoxically no question of assigning a truth-value to the statements that the problematic sentences make, for those sentences fail to make any statements.  A statement to the effect that it itself lacks any semantic status is simply false. The sentence ‘This sentence is either false or fails to make a statement’ is neither true nor false (for sentences are not truth-value-apt) and it fails to make a statement and hence does not state that it so fails. The same holds for ‘This sentence either makes a false statement or no statement at all’ — if that sentence cannot be used to make a statement then it certainly cannot be used to state truly that it either makes a false statement or no statement at all. With the pair < (L`), (K`) > we can consistently assign the value ‘true’ to the second when the first is determined to be not capable of making a statement.

Ad hocery. None. The sentence/statement distinction is a long established one that was elaborated independently in two classic papers that appeared in the same year (Austin (1950), Strawson (1950)). It is motivated by considerations that have nothing to do with the semantical paradoxes, but the idea that, under some circumstances, meaningful sentences may fail to express propositions, has been usefully employed in the paradox literature (Kneale (1972), Kripke (1975), Skyrms (1984)). We have not advocated an ad hoc ban on self-reference, but have given specific arguments for why certain sentences that (directly or indirectly) point to themselves fail to yield statements. One of these arguments relied on the Symmetry Assumption but the others did not.

Incompleteness. It would be a strike against a proposed solution to the Liar if it did not extend to other semantical paradoxes such as the Barber, Grelling’s Paradox and the Semantical Curry. But indications are that the cassationist approach succeeds not just with the semantical paradoxes (Goldstein 2000, 2004, 2006a) but with the logical paradoxes too and thus offers the hope of finding that Holy Grail, a unified solution to all the logico-semantical paradoxes. What links the two groups of paradox can be seen by reflecting that no class R (the Russell Class) is defined by

	DefR:  (x)(x є R iff ~(x є x))

because, expanding out this ‘definition’ as a conjunction, we observe that it contains one conjunct, ‘R є R iff ~(R є R)’, that is vacuous in that it fails to supply a condition for membership of R, thus vitiating DefR as a definition. As we noted with the Strengthened Liar sentence (L`), the attempt set out the truth-conditions identifying a statement made by it likewise resulted only in a vacuous biconditional.

Expressivity. We argued that there can be no statement that states of itself that it not true.  This is hardly indicative of an expressive limitation of language. A speaker can utter a sentence to the effect that what he or she is saying is not true and, although that speaker may fail to produce anything that is true or false, another speaker (even using exactly the same words) can truly say of the original speaker’s utterance that it is not true. If there is any expressive limitation here it is no more noxious than the inability of an eye to see itself even though others can see it. When I assert

   (A)  This statement is interesting

what I am asserting to be interesting is (A). When I (try to) assert

(B)	This statement is false

I am trying to assert as false (B). But to assert is to acknowledge as true. Therefore there can no more be an assertion of (B) than there can be a simultaneous opening and closing of a door.
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^1	 Footnotes It also goes under the name ‘The no-no paradox’ (Sorensen 2001: 166).
^2	  I have adapted, not adopted López de Sa and Zardini’s original example because, instead of ‘believable/unbelievable’, they use ‘short/long’. As will become clear later, we wish to insist that, while sentences may be long or short, it is statements that are true or false, so ‘X is true and long’ is ill-formed by our lights. If, by your lights, it is not, then return to the original López de Sa / Zardini example because the absurdity they derive is even more striking: that whichever of the pair is true is long, while the other, which is false, is short! Manifestly the two sentences are equal in length.  
^3	  For comparisons of this sort, see Goldstein (2006b).
^4	  An anonymous referee points out that abandoning bivalence might be held to be an ineffective remedy even for the Simple Liar (L). For, if, in line with that strategy, we maintain that (L) is neither true nor false, then, in saying of itself that it is false, (L) ‘speaks’ falsely, i.e. it is false after all.
^5	  As Nicholas Rescher notes (2001: 165), the ancients were alert to this type of failure to identify. Suppose that the response to the request ‘Identify for me the place where Theon lives’ were ‘He lives where Dion lives’. ‘And where does Dion live?’; ‘He lives where Theon lives’. The difference between this example and the problem of identifying what statement, if any, the Liar sentence makes is that there are alternative ways of locating where Theon lives but there seems to be no  alternative to examining truth conditions when it comes to identifying what statement, if any, the Liar sentence yields. See also Rescher (2001: 198-9) on Paul of Venice, who takes the same view as the one defended here, that no statements are delivered by sentences in the Liar family.
^6	  Brian Skyrms (1984: 119-120) makes the point more dramatically, with an example deriving from Buridan’s Ninth Sophism: Socrates utters the words ‘The next utterance of Plato will not be true’ and that utterance of Plato’s is ‘Socrates speaks truly’. At that point, Chryssipus intrudes, saying ‘Neither of the foregoing utterances is true or false. They are more like the cries of animals’. The Chryssipian intuition, says Skyrms, is that the utterances of both Socrates and Plato lack truth value, whereas Chryssipus’ own utterance ‘stands above the fray, and thus can comment truly on it’.
